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Abstract Two-stage n-player games with spanning tree are considered. The
cooperative behaviour of players is dened. After the rst stage, a specied
player leaves the game with a probability that depends on the actions of
all players in the rst stage. A new approach to the construction of the
characteristic function is proposed. In the game, all players are connected
with the source directly or indirectly. Assume that the players in coalition
N \ S have already connected to the source when the players in coalition
S ⊂ N wish to connect to the source. The players in coalition S could
connect to the source with the help of the players in coalition N \ S. A
new characteristic function is dened in the game, and the Shapley value is
constructed. Several results based on the new characteristic function in the
two-stage stochastic game are given.
Keywords: dynamic game, minimum cost spanning tree, Shapley value
1. Introduction
In the minimum cost spanning tree game, it is considered that a group of play-
ers need to connect the source to get some service or benet and share the total
cost between them. In (Bird, 1976), it is the rst time to propose a groundbreak-
ing method to solve this problem, namely the Bird rule, and it is a cost alloca-
tion rule in the game with spanning tree. After this, dierent kinds of solutions in
the game with spanning tree have been proposed. Such as the core and nucleolus
(Granot and Huberman, 1984), the Folk solution (Feltkamp et al., 1994), the Kar
rule (Kar, 2002), and the fair rule (Bergantinos et al, 2007a).
Especially in (Bergantinos et al., 2007b), the author considered that the players
in coalition S ⊂ N might indirectly connect to the source with the help of the
players in the coalition N \ S, while the players in the coalition N \ S already
connected with the source. The game described before is named as the "optimistic"
minimum cost spanning tree game.1 In this paper, it is considered to construct the
Shapley value in the "optimistic" game.
In (Li, 2016), a two-stage spanning tree game with shock is considered, and as-
sumed that after the rst stage in the game, a particular player would leave the game
with a probability that depends on the situation in the rst stage. In this research the
characteristic functions for coalitions are dened by the Bird method(Bird, 1976).
The dynamic Shapley value is considered as a solution in the game. In (Yin, 2017),
a two-stage spanning tree game with perishable products is studied. In the game,
all players need to share the total cost of edges on the minimum cost spanning
1The corresponding "pessimistic" game means that the players in coalition S are con-
nected to the source without the help of others.
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tree and the loss caused by the perishable products. The research concluded that
the dynamic Shapley value is time inconsistent in the two-stage game with perish-
able products. Also the two-stage game with forest is studied(Yin, 2017). In this
research, there are n players and m ≥ 2 sources in the game. It is proved that
using the imputation distribution procedure (IDP)(Petrosyan, 1979), the dynamic
Shapley value constructed in the game will be time consistent if there is at least one
player who wants to connect to all sources. Furthermore, in (Yin, 2020), the two-
stage stochastic game with spanning tree is present. In this research, a transition
matrix determined by the players is introduced.
In the paper, an "optimistic" two-stage game with spanning tree is considered.
The players in the coalition S ⊂ N no longer need to connect with the source
directly. If necessary, the coalition S can indirectly connect with the source by the
players who are not in the coalition S. At the beginning of the game, an initial
cost matrix is given. In each stage game, arbitrary two players can take actions to
redene the cost of the edge between them. For any two players, if they did not take
action together to change the cost of the edge, then the cost of the edge between
them will remain xed as the cost of the edge from the initial cost matrix at the
beginning of the game. All players choose their actions simultaneously at the rst
stage. As shown in Fig.1, after the rst stage, a particular player m may leave the
game with probability p. The probability is dened by actions of all players in the
rst stage.
Fig. 1. Process of the game
2. The model
2.1. Basic denitions
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a nite set of players. The source is denoted by {0}, and
N ′ = N ∪{0}. A graph over N ′ is denoted by G = (N ′, E). E is the set of all edges.
A pair (i, j) is called an edge in G(N ′, E), if (i, j) ∈ E, ∀i, j ∈ N . A coalition S is
the subset of N , where S ⊆ N and S′ = S ∪ {0}.
Denition 1. A path in a graph is a nite or innite sequence of edges that links a
set of distinct vertices. If there is a path from vertex i to j, then i and j are said to
be connected. The graph is called a connected graph if any two vertices in a graph
are connected.
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Denition 2. G(N ′, E) (or G(S′, E)) is dened as the connected graph over N ′
(or S′). GN ′ (or GS′) is a set of connected graphs with vertices in N ′ (or S′), where
S ⫋ N .
Example 1. Consider an example. N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, S = {1, 2, 3} ⊂ N , N ′ = N∪{0},
S′ = S ∪ {0}, {0} is the source. As shown in Fig.2, which represents two dierent
connected graphs ĠN ′ and G̈N ′ over N
′, and Fig.3 shows two connected graphs ĠS′
and G̈S′ over S
′.
Fig. 2. Connected graphs over N ′ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
Fig. 3. Connected graphs over S′ = {0, 1, 2, 3}
C = (cij)(n+1)×(n+1) is a cost matrix, in which all elements represent the costs
of edges between vertexes on the graph G(N ′, E). cij = cji > 0 is the cost of edge
(i, j),∀i, j ∈ N ′.
The cost matrix associated with G(N ′, E) (or G(S′, E)) is denoted by C (or
CS).
Denition 3. In G(N ′, E), an initial cost matrix C0 is dened as




ji > 0,∀i ̸= j ∈ N ′
Consider an example about the initial cost matrix.
Example 2. As shown in Fig.4, N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, N ′ = N ∪ {0}.
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Fig. 4. Initial cost matrix C0
The initial cost matrix associated with the graph G(N ′, E) is
C0 =

0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 1 2 3 2 4
1 1 0 2 4 3 2
2 2 2 0 5 4 2
3 3 4 5 0 3 1
4 2 3 4 3 0 3
5 4 2 2 1 3 0

2.2. Stage game
In each stage game, all players choose actions simultaneously. Then the cost
matrix associated with the graph G(N ′, E) is dened.
Denition 4. A strategy of player i is denoted by a vector
xi = (xi,1, ..., xi,i−1, xi,i+1, ..., xi,n)
where xi,j is a strategy of player i against j, ∀i ̸= j ∈ N . Xi,j denotes the set of all
strategies of player i against j, ∀xi,j ∈ Xi,j .
The cost of edge (i, j) is dened as cij = cji = fc(xi,j , xj,i), where the cost
function fc is a mapping from the set of strategies of players i, j to the set of
positive real numbers. So the cost of edge (i, j) is determined by the player i and
j, ∀i ̸= j ∈ N .
The cost of the edge between source {0} and player i ∈ N is equal to the cost
of the edge in the initial cost matrix. i.e





For strategy prole x = (x1, x2, ..., xn), the cost matrix associated withG(N
′, Cx)
is denoted by Cx = (cij)(n+1)×(n+1).
Denition 5. (Bird, 1976), the minimum cost spanning tree over N ′ is dened as
follows





where Cx = (cij)(n+1)×(n+1) is the cost matrix dened by the strategy prole x =
(x1, x2, ..., xn), ∀i ̸= j ∈ N .
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Denition 6. The total cost of edges in the minimum cost spanning tree T (N ′, Cx)
is dened as
C[T (N ′, Cx)] =
∑
(i,j)∈T (N ′,Cx)
cij ,∀i ̸= j ∈ N
where Cx = (cij)(n+1)×(n+1) is the cost matrix dened by strategy prole x =
(x1, x2, ..., xn).
Example 3. N = {1, 2, 3}, N ′ = N ∪ {0}. The sets of the strategies of the players
are shown in Tab.1.












2 6 10 4 8 20 4 12 16
Assume that fc = xi,j×xj,i, xi,j ∈ Xi,j , xj,i ∈ Xj,i, i ̸= j ∈ N . If player 1 chooses
x1,2 = 1, x1,3 = 3, player 2 chooses x2,1 = 3, x2,3 = 2, and player 3 chooses strategy
x3,1 = 2, x3,2 = 3. The cost of edge (1, 2) is c12 = c21 = fc(x1,2, x2,1) = x1,2x2,1 = 3.
Similarly, the cost of edge (1, 3) is c13 = c31 = 6, and the cost of edge (2, 3) is
c23 = c32 = 6.
Thus, the cost matrix determined by the strategy prole x = (x1, x2, ..., x3) is
Cx =

0 1 2 3
0 0 20 15 30
1 20 0 3 6
2 15 3 0 6
3 30 6 6 0

As shown in Fig.5, on the left side it is an entire graph G(N ′, Cx) with cost. On
the right side it is a minimum cost spanning tree T (N ′, Cx) on the graph G(N
′, Cx).
Fig. 5. G(N ′, Cx) and T (N
′, Cx)
Thus, the total cost of edges on the minimum cost spanning tree T (N ′, Cx) is
C(T (N ′, Cx)) = 24, the strategies proles of player 1, 2 and 3 are x1 = (1, 3), x2 =
(3, 2), x3 = (2, 3).
Consider two types of games with spanning trees on subgraph: "optimistic"
game with spanning tree (Bergantinos et al., 2007b) and "pessimistic" game with
spanning tree.
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2.3. "pessimistic" game with spanning tree on subgraph
The "pessimistic" game with spanning tree on subgraph involves the players
in coalition S ⫋ N connected with the source {0} without any help from players
outside of the coalition S.
Denition 7. (Bird, 1976) The minimum cost spanning tree on coalition S ⫋ N
in the "pessimistic" game with spanning tree is dened as





where CxS is the cost matrix dened by strategy prole xS .
Denition 8. The total cost of edges on the minimum cost spanning tree T (S,Cx)
is




where CxS is the cost matrix dened by strategy prole xS .
2.4. "optimistic" game with spanning tree on subgraph
In contrast to the above, in the optimistic game, if the coalition S ⫋ N needs
the help of the coalition N \ S, the total cost of the coalition S consists of two
parts, one is the total cost of spanning subtree of coalition S, and the other is the
cost of connecting the coalition S to the coalition N \ S. It means that using the
connection to the source within coalition N \ S is cost free for coalition S. In this
research, if the coalition N \ S supports the coalition S, the costs of the edges that
will be provided between them are equal to the costs of the edges in the initial cost
matrix.
Denition 9. The minimum cost spanning tree for coalition S in the "optimistic"
game is dened as follow










where CxS is the cost matrix dened by strategy prole xS .
Denition 10. The total cost of edges in the minimum cost spanning tree
T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS ) is




where CxS is the cost matrix dened by strategy prole xS .
Example 4. N = {1, 2, 3}, N ′ = N ∪ {0}, S = {2, 3}, fc = xi,j × xj,i, xi,j ∈
Xi,j , xj,i ∈ Xj,i, i ̸= j ∈ N . As shown in Fig.6, player 2 and player 3 choose
their actions x2,3 = 2, x3,2 = 5, thus the cost of edge (2, 3) is equal to 10. The total
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Fig. 6. "pessimistic" game and "optimistic" game on subgraph
cost of minimum cost spanning tree T (S,CxS ) is
C[T (S,CxS )] = 26
and the total cost of minimum cost spanning tree T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS ) is
C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS )] = 12
2.5. Two-stage game with spanning tree
Let Pm0 denote the path from the source to m on G(N
′, E). P (m)  an immedi-
ate predecessor of m in the minimum cost spanning tree T (N ′, Cx), if P (m) ∈ Pm0
and (P (m),m) ∈ T (N ′, Cx).




C[T (N ′, Cx)]
where B(m) is the set of all edges of the subtree with root m.
The rst stage: All players choose their strategies proles simultaneously:
















where x1i,j is an action of player i against j,∀i ̸= j ∈ N .
The second stage: Since the player m may leave the game, there are two types
of stage game.
If m does not exit the game, all players choose their strategy proles at the same
time, just as they behaved in the rst stage:
















where x2i,j is an action of player i against j and x
2
i,j ∈ X2i,j , ∀i ̸= j ∈ N .
If the player m leaves the game. The players choose their strategies proles:












where x2i,j is an action of player i against j and x
2
i,j ∈ X2i,j , ∀i ̸= j ∈ N \ {m}.
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3. Cooperative game
Now we dene the characteristic function for the grand coalition N in the game.
Let x(·) denote the strategy of players in the game.
V 1(N ′) = min
x(·)
{C[T (N ′, Cx1)]+ [pC[T (N ′ \{m}, Cx2\{m})]+ (1−p)C[T (N ′, Cx2)]]}
= C[T (N ′, Cx̄1)] + [pC[T (N




C[T (N ′,Cx̄1 )]
, x̄i(·) is the cooperative strategy of player i, and the
strategy prole x̄(·) is called cooperative strategy prole.
Then dene the characteristic function for the grand coalition N in subgame.
If player m leaves the game after the rst stage,
V 2(N ′ \ {m}) = min
x2(·)
C[T (N ′ \ {m}, Cx2\{m})]
= C[T (N ′ \ {m}, Cx̄2)]
where x̄2i (·), i ∈ N \{m} are the cooperative strategies, and the cooperative strategy
prole is x̄2(·).
If player m does not leave the game,
V 2(N ′) = min
x2(·)
C[T (N ′, Cx2)] = C[T (N
′, Cx̄2)]
where x̄2i (·), i ∈ N are cooperative strategies, and the cooperative strategy prole
is x̄2(·).
3.1. The characteristic function in "pessimistic" game with spanning
tree
By the Bird(Bird, 1976) method, the characteristic function for the coalition
S ⫋ N is dened.
If m ∈ S,
V 1(S′) = min
xS(·)
{C[T (S,CSx1S )] + [pC[T (S \ {m}, C
S\{m}
x2S\{m}
)] + (1− p)C[T (S,CSx2S )]]}
= C[T (S,CSx̄1S
)] + [pC[T (S \ {m}, CS\{m}
x̄2S\{m}








, CS and CS\{m} is the cost matrix restricted to S and
S \ {m}.
If m /∈ S,
V 1(S′) = min
xS(·)
[C[T (S,CSx1S
)] + C[T (S,CSx2S
)]] = C[T (S,CSx̄1S
)] + C[T (S,CSx̄2S
)]
where CS and CS\{m} is the cost matrix restricted to S and S \ {m}.
Since player m will never leave the game, the value of the characteristic function
for the coalition S is equal to the total cost of edges in the minimum costs spanning
tree over S′:









where S ⊂ N,S′ = S ∪ {0}, CS′ is the cost matrix restricted to S′.
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3.2. The characteristic function in "optimistic" game with spanning
tree
The characteristic function for coalition S is dened as follows.
If m ∈ S, S ⫋ N , and S′ = S ∪ {0}
V 1+(S′) = min
xS(·)
{C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CSx1S )] + [pC[T
+(S \ {m}, N ′ \ S \ {m}, CS\{m}
x2S\{m}
)]
+(1− p)C(T+(N ′, CSx2S ))]}
= C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CSx̄1S )] + [pC[T
+(S \ {m}, N ′ \ S \ {m}, CS\{m}
x̄2S\{m}
)]











′\{m} is the cost matrix restricted to S′
and S′ \ {m}.
If m /∈ S, S ⫋ N , and S′ = S ∪ {0}
V 1+(S′) = min
xS(·)
[C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CSx1S )] + C[T
+(S,N ′ \ S,CSx2S )]]
= C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CSx̄1S )] + C[T
+(S,N ′ \ S,CSx̄2S )]
where CS is the cost matrix restricted to S, CS
′
is the cost matrix restricted to S′.
The characteristic function for the coalition S in subgame:
V 2+(S′) = min
xS(·)
C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CSx2S )] = C[T
+(S,N ′ \ S,CSx̄2S )]
where CS
′
is the cost matrix restricted to S′.
4. The Shapley value in the two stage "optimistic" game with spanning
tree.
On the basis of the above discussion, we can dene Shapley values in the two







[V 1+(S′π(i) ∪ {i})− V
1+(S′π(i))]
where Π denotes the set of all permutations on N , and Sπ(k) = {i|π(i) < π(k)}.
In the similar way, the Shapley value in subgame is dened as follows.
If player m leaves the game after the rst stage:
Sh2+i (N




[V 2+(S′π′(i) ∪ {i})− V
2+(S′π′(i))]
where Π ′ denotes the set of all permutations on N \ {m}, and Sπ′(k) = {i|π′(i) <
π′(k)}.







[V 2+(S′π(i) ∪ {i})− V
2+(S′π(i))]
where Π denotes the set of all permutations on N , and Sπ(k) = {i|π(i) < π(k)}.
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5. Results
Theorem 1.
C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS )] ≤ C[T (S′, N \ S′, CxS )], S ⫋ N
where CxS is the cost matrix dened by strategy prole xS.
Proof. By denition 9, there are only two possible forms of the minimum cost
spanning tree T+(S,N ′ \S,CxS ). The rst case is the coalition S connected directly
to the source; the second case is connected via one or several vertexes in the coalition
N \ S.
Case 1: if the coalition S connected directly to the source {0}, the minimum
cost spanning tree T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS ) is over S′ = S ∪ {0}. On the graph G(S′, E)
with cost matrix CxS , the "optimistic" minimum cost spanning tree is the same to
"pessimistic" minimum cost spanning tree, T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS ) = T (S,N ′ \ S,CxS ).
i.e.
C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS )] = C[T (S′, N \ S′, CxS )]
Case 2: if the coalition S connected with the source {0} via one or several
vertexes in the coalitionN\S overN ′, consider using the converse method, such that
the total cost of T+(S,N ′ \S,CxS ) is larger than the total cost of T (S,N ′ \S,CxS ).
i.e.
C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS )] > C[T (S′, N \ S′, CxS )], S ⫋ N
Then the coalition S can achieve the case where it is connected to source {0}
and reduces the total cost by connecting directly to source {0} and removing the
edges associated with the vortexes in N \S, i.e. such case (C[T+(S,N ′ \S,CxS )] >
C[T (S′, N \ S′, CxS )], S ⫋ N) does not exist.
The theorem is proven. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2.
C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS )] ⩽ C[T+(S,N ′ \ {m} \ S,CxS )], S ⫋ N
where CxS is the cost matrix dened by strategy prole xS.
Proof. Two cases are considered in the minimum cost spanning tree T+(S,N ′ \
S,CxS ) obtained on the graph G(S
′, E) with cost matrix CxS : the rst case, in which
the help of the playerm is needed, i.e. the minimum spanning tree T+(S,N ′\S,CxS )
contains m; and the second case, in which the help of the player m is not needed.
Case 1: if the coalition S connected to the source {0} with the help of the player
m, the minimum cost spanning tree T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS ) can be represented as












where CxS is the cost matrix dened by strategy prole xS .
After the player m leaves the game, there will be three possible changes to the
new minimum cost spanning tree T+(S,N ′ \ {m} \ S,CxS ).
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 If the total cost of the minimum cost spanning tree T+(S,N ′ \ {m} \ S,CxS )
that does not contain the player m is equal to the total cost of the previous
minimum cost spanning tree T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS ), i.e.
C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS )] = C[T+(S,N ′ \ {m} \ S,CxS )], S ⫋ N
 If the total cost of the minimum cost spanning tree T+(S,N ′\{m}\S,CxS ) that
does not contain the player m is larger than to the total cost of the previous
minimum cost spanning tree T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS ), i.e.
C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS )] < C[T+(S,N ′ \ {m} \ S,CxS )], S ⫋ N
 If the total cost of the minimum cost spanning tree T+(S,N ′ \ {m} \ S,CxS )
that does not contain the player m is less than to the total cost of the previous
minimum cost spanning tree T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS ), i.e.
C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS )] < C[T+(S,N ′ \ {m} \ S,CxS )], S ⫋ N
By Denition 9, it means that the minimum spanning tree game T+(S,N ′ \
S,CxS ) for coalition S is not the minimum total cost, since a much less total
cost can be achieved by excluding the edges associated with m. This contradicts
the statement of the theorem. Therefore this case does not exist.
Case 2: Assume that the players in the coalition S is not connected to the
source {0} with the help of the player m,
C[T+(S,N ′ \ S,CxS )] = C[T+(S,N ′ \ {m} \ S,CxS )]
The theorem is proven. ⊓⊔
6. Example
The set of players is N = 1, 2, 3, the source is {0}, N ′ = N ∪ {0}. Assume that
player 3 may leave the game after stage 1. As shown in Fig.7, there are initial costs
of the edges between each player.
Fig. 7. The graph G(N,E) with initial costs of the edges
The initial cost matrix C0 is
C0 =

0 1 2 3
0 0 12 10 15
1 12 0 1 2
2 10 1 0 2
3 15 2 2 0

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2 4 6 2 3 7 1 4 6
X1,2
1 2 4 6
X1,3
2 4 6 14
X2,3
3 3 12 18
3 6 12 18 3 6 9 21 6 6 24 36
5 10 20 30 5 10 15 35 7 7 28 42
The strategy set for each player is shown in Tab. 2.
Assume the function fc = xi,j × xj,i. For example, if player 1 choose action
x1,2 = 3 and player 2 choose action x2,1 = 4. The cost of edge (1, 2) will be
c12 = fc(x1,2, x2,1) = x1,2x2,1 = 12.















3) = ((2, 1), (2, 1))
The probability of player 3 leaving the game is p = 0.467 and V 1(N) = 28.599.
The characteristic function for each coalition and the Shapley value in two-stage
"optimistic" game with spanning tree:
V 1+({1}) = 4, V 1+({2}) = 4, V 1+({3}) = 4.599
V 1+({1, 2}) = 10, V 1+({1, 3}) = 10.132, V 1+({2, 3}) = 8.599
Sh1+1 (N
′, C) = 9.922, Sh1+2 (N
′, C) = 9.156, Sh1+3 (N
′, C) = 9.442
Similarly, the characteristic function for each coalition and Shapley value in sub-
game:
If player m doesn't leave the game
V 2(N ′) = 15, V 2+({1}) = 2, V 2+({2}) = 2
V 2+({3}) = 3, V 2+({1, 2}) = 4, V 2+({1, 3}) = 5, V 2+({2, 3}) = 4
Sh2+1 (N
′, C) = 5, Sh2+2 (N
′, C) = 4.5, Sh2+3 (N
′, C) = 5.5
If player m leaves the game
V 2(N ′) = 12, V 2+({1}) = 2, V 2+({2}) = 2
V 2+({3}) = 0, V 2+({1, 2}) = 12, V 2+({1, 3}) = 0, V 2+({2, 3}) = 0
Sh2+1 (N
′, C) = 6, Sh2+2 (N
′, C) = 6, Sh2+3 (N
′, C) = 0
7. Conclusion
This paper considers the Shapley value in a two-stage "optimistic" game with a
spanning tree. It assumes that players in coalition S may indirectly connect to the
source with the help of players, not in the coalition S. The denition of Shapley
value in the "optimistic" game with spanning tree is given. Several theorems and
examples are provided.
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